The objective of this paper is to find the stationary distribution of a certain class of Markov chains arising in a biological population involved in a specific type of evolutionary conflict, known as Parker's model. In a population of such players, the result of repeated, infrequent, attempted invasions using strategies from   
Introduction
In classical model in conflict theory [1] , Parker's model [2] , two individuals compete for a reward V by selecting times from some set. Here we suppose that the available times are integer values in . If a player chooses x and his opponent y then the payoff to the player , is given by
The scenario envisaged is as follows. An individual choosing time x displays for that length of time, incurring a cost x. If x exceeds his opponents' choice y then he collects the reward. In the event of a tie the reward is shared. In a population in which individuals are restricted to play either u or v, where then the payoff matrix P is simply
u the first row strictly dominates the second (that is 11  21 and 12  22 ) , and if
the second strictly dominates the first. We consider a population of individuals playing Parker's model. We suppose that the population evolves as follows. Suppose at some time there is a population all of whom are playing a single strategy u (i.e. the population is monomorphic). A new strategy v arises by some random process. If u dominates v then the strategy v will be eliminated under any reasonable dynamic. On the other hand if v dominates u, it will rapidly increase in frequency and displace u. We will suppose that the introduction of new strategies is infrequent compared with the time taken for this replacement process. For a more detailed discussion of this model see [3] .
The Class of Markov Chains
We investigate here the following class of Markov chains, [4] , motivated by the above scenario. We suppose the available strategy set is and the reward
The use of rather than V = 2 ensures that in every pair of strategies u and v, where
 , one is dominant. The case allows particularly neat forms for the distributions, whereas other values of V require more complex, less elegant analysis and will be presented elsewhere. New strategies arise from the set M. If the current strategy is i and a new strategy j arises this latter will invade iff
If we suppose that the strategies arise with equal probabilities 1 m then we have a Markov chain with transition matrix 
where, throughout, k is the identity matrix, k is a k element column vector and is a k element row vector. 
and so
We have This is valid for using and
Suppose we write   specified as   a n , where our where the sequence is initiated with and
We can extract individual elements of the stationary distributions. Suppose that is the i'th element Table 1 gives some values of .
 
, u m i
The Asymptotic Eigenvector
Having derived recurrence relations for the elements of the eigenvectors we now consider the limit as . We begin with a simple Lemma.
m  

Lemma
In the absence of a simple way of evaluating the limiting ratios discussed above analytically we adopt a different method to derive the asymptotic stationary distribution, again expressed in integers. Suppose this is given by
, and define
Suppose we have a recurrence relation of the form 
Conclusion
We have derived the stationary distribution of the frequencies of the available strategies in a population in which mutations occur infrequently, for Parke's model when the reward is 2 + and for integer valued strategies. These relate to certain known integer sequences. This work provides a base for further investigations for other values of the reward, and more complex invasion processes.
Discussion
Parker's model, which is also known as the Scotch Auction, is often used in the conflict theory literature as an example of a simple model in which there is no ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy). The implication of this is that there is no population assembly which is resistant to invasion. Of course if such a contests actually occurs it is important to ask what will happen in the population. This is the question which is addressed in [3] , and which generates the class of matrices considered here. The stationary distribution then corresponds to the frequency with which one would observe a population to be playing a specific strategy, except if one happened on a population in transition.

The class of cases discusses above arises from Parker's model when we consider a fixed reward value 2 V   , and when the value of m, the range of possible strategies, is allowed to vary. It would be of interest to examine other possible values of V as m varies. For example, for , the "Markov matrices" have 1's for , 0's for and diagonal elements to make the row sums m. It is hoped to treat these models in a subsequent paper.
We observe from the numerical values that the most frequent strategy value played is 1, that the distribution is uni-modal and that the strategies  are played over 90% of the time; asymptotically approximately 0.90667 which agrees to five decimal places to the value for , while the mean value is asymptotically approximately 1.1207 which agrees to five decimal places to the value for . These latter figures confirm the rapidity of the convergence.
